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I 
In earlier dialogues, such as the Phaedo, Socrates 
concerns himself with the life that frees the soul from 
the corporeal, while in the Philebus he inquires into 
the composition of the good life. Are both lives the 
same? Freedom from the corporeal is of central impor-
tance to Socrates because the corporeal is subject to 
change and decay. As such, it is not that which most 
truly is, and therefore is in a sense illusory. If one 
is to become free from the corporeal, one must turn 
away from the corporeal by engaging in the search for 
truth, for that which most truly is. In the life of 
philosophy this enterprise is undertaken. The art of 
philosophizing is the art of dying, of dying to the 
corporeal. 
The Phaedo advocates such a life, and at the same 
time, it along with other earlier dialogues, seems to 
associate pleasure and pain with the corporeal. In the 
search for truth, one moves beyond the bodily ex-
perience of pleasure and pain to the immortality resul-
ting from action and dialectic. This seems perplexing, 
for one ordinarily would think that pleasure ought to 
be an element found in the good life. What precisely 
is to be done about pleasure? Is it to be totally ex-
cluded from the life of philosophy? Is it to be ex-
cluded from the good life? Is excluding it from the 
one the same as excluding it from the other? We can 
effectively answer these questions by turning to the 
Philebus, for there we discover that Plato's treatment 
of pleasure and pain is not so simple—or simplistic— 
as might initially be supposed. 
If we were to compare the Philebus with an earlier 
dialogue such as the Phaedo, we might initially be 
tempted to claim that the latter is the more "beauti-
ful" of the two and therefore the more "pleasing." But 
for Plato, it is the Philebus with its appeal to di-
alectic, its slight use of imagery, and its almost 
total abandonment of myth which is truly the more 
appealing. Why? Because it recognizes explicitly what 
the Phaedo recognizes only implicitly through its aes-
thetic appeal to the senses, namely, that the good life 
247 
Auslegung Vol. X, No. 3 
ISSN: 0733-4311 
is a life which must include pleasure, but pleasure of 
a certain kind. The good life is one in which pleasure 
necessarily accompanies the art of dialectic and the 
special kind of contemplation granted only to few, 
which will be described later. Pleasure necessarily 
accompanies these because we are human. We are not 
gods! We are not pure reason which can stand indepen-
dently of pleasure because our corporeal nature does 
not allow it. So long as the soul is encased in the 
body, even it cannot escape pleasure. 
But it is possible for the soul to be rightly cap-
tive only to that pleasure which accompanies the art 
that moves beyond our human estate. Why in the Phaedo 
does Socrates reject the life of pleasure? He rejects 
it because he considers it strictly in its mixed form, 
as numerous passages illustrate: 
But if she be defiled and impure when she leaves 
the body, from being ever with it, and serving it 
. . . and from being besotted by it and by its 
desires and pleasures, so that she thinks nothing 
true but what is bodily . . . if she has learned 
to hate and tremble at, and fly from what is dark 
and invisible to the eye, and intelligible and 
apprehended by philosophy—do you think that a 
soul which is in that state will be pure and 
without alloy at her departure? 1 
What distinguishes the Philebus is that Socrates ex-
plicitly recognizes the importance of a true pleasure 
which he cannot escape if he is to take the path which 
points beyond his mortal state and the pleasures which 
accompany it. What makes the Philebus interesting is 
that the human condition, as Socrates so forcefully 
presents it, has as its complement and as the basis of 
its understanding the ontological s truer tu re of the 
universe. In short, the philosophic life, the good 
life, is nothing less than a mirror reflecting the in-
terplay between Limit and Limitlessness. The Limitless 
is the indeterminate, infinite many expanding in both 
directions. Its power meets with, mixes with, the 
power of Limit, which is the One, that which imposes 
determinateness through the introduction of ratio. It 
is this which explains the structure of reality and the 
order found therein. The good life mirrors this 
because it involves the limiting of limitless pleasure 
through the application of reason. 
Our task is twofold. First, we must examine the 
Philebus to come to an understanding of the nature of 
the good life and the role pleasure plays in that life. 
Secondly, through the development of our first objec-
tive, we must consider more carefully both whether 
there is a parallel between the good life and the 
structure of reality and in what that parallel 
consists. 
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II 
Well, Philebus says that the good for all animate 
beings consists in enjoyment, pleasure, delight, 
and whatever can be classed as consonant there-
with, whereas our contention is that the good is 
not that, but that thought, intelligence, memory, 
and things akin to these, right opinion and true 
reasoning, prove better and more valuable that 
pleasure for all such beings as can participate 
in them, and that for all these, whether now liv-
ing or yet to be born, nothing in the world is 
more profitable than so to participate . . . 2 
In these early lines of the Philebus, the two fundamen-
tal positions to be explored are laid out. Later in 
the dialogue (60a), Socrates elaborates on the position 
of Philebus, and defended by Protarchus, that pleasure 
is the right aim of all living things, and that it 
ought, therefore, to be sought. Philebus does not 
claim that all creatures do in fact seek it, but he 
does hold that 'good' and 'pleasant' have the same 
meaning. Thus, the Hedonism which he advocates is ex-
treme, allowing no value to anything except pleasure. 
Socrates' position, on the other hand, is not an ex-
treme one.' He suggests that, 11 thoughtfulness in 
deciding how to act the apprehending of what is in-
telligible only the power of memory, right opinion 
and true calculations " are better than pleasure, 
but better only for those capable of them.*1 He does 
not exclude the possibility, however, that pleasure 
might have some intrinsic value. 
Notice, however, what happens with these classifi-
cations of the good and the pleasant. With the claim 
that pleasure is the highest good the discussion actu-
ally centers on what is the highest good, 5 and through 
Socrates' addendum of a criterion of capability toge-
ther with his agreement with Protarchus that they are 
only going to consider a condition of the soul capable 
of providing human happiness, 5 we find that the discus-
sion is going to focus on the highest good for the 
human. Moreover, Socrates indicates further that the 
dialogue will not consist merely in attempts to defend 
either his own position or that of Protarchus when he 
suggests that there may be some third alternative that 
will win the argument (lld-e). 
With these preliminary considerations complete, 
Socrates begins to question Protarchus about the unity 
of pleasure. Protarchus argues that it is true that 
pleasure can arise from differing sources, but that 
this does not mean pleasure differs from itself. 
Socrates counters with an examination of figure and 
says that, as a class, all figure is one, while, within 
the class, some figures are absolutely opposite to each 
other (12e). But Protarchus is not willing to readily 
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surrender his opinion concerning the unity of pleasure. 
It is not until Socrates contends that there are many 
kinds of knowledge as well that Protarchus is brought 
to submission (13b-14a). Protarchus is pleased to find 
that Socrates' candidate is in the same position as his 
own. * 
However, R. Hackforth points out that Protarchus 
could have rejected Socrates' analogy on the grounds 
that there is no counterpart in pleasure, as in figure, 
if we take pleasant to mean pleasant feeling per se. 
There is a counterpart to pleasure only if we take 
pleasure to mean both the complex and the source of 
feeling. Socrates' argument implies this second sense 
throughout the present section. Why does Plato not al-
low for Protarchus' suggestion? Hackforth's answer is 
that Plato believed there to be genuine qualitative 
differences between pleasure-feelings. He believed 
that the feeling aroused by listening to great music, 
for instance, is qualitatively different from that 
aroused by eating cake, though he could not prove it.* 
Furthermore, he probably felt it unreasonable to expect 
him to prove it, since the isolated pleasure-feeling is 
nothing more than an abstraction, for " . . . what 
really occurs is always 'my pleasure in this', an in-
divisible whole though divisible in analysis. 1" We 
shall see later the importance of this notion of pleas-
ure being always related to that which gives the pleas-
ure when discussing true and false pleasures. But what 
is most interesting at this point is the openning 
provided by this examination of pleasure for a discus-
sion of the one and the many. 
Jacob Klein makes the observation that the dialogue 
initially is concerned with things familiar to u s — i t 
is concerned with our lives in the world of experience. 
With the introduction of the topic of the one and the 
many, the conversation is lifted to the level of "all-
embracing universality."" Conversation concerning 
pleasure and knowledge is disregarded for the moment. 
This jump from common experience to a higher level is 
one which occurs several times in the dialogue. Why 
does this happen? Klein suggests that Socrates is 
searching for the ultimate sources of what is close to 
but unquestioned by u s . 1 1 I will suggest that, indeed, 
Socrates is attmepting to construct a link between the 
good life of man and the structure of reality. But 
Klein does not see this link in the same way as I, 
since we differ on the parallel to be drawn between the 
structure of the good life and the structure of 
reality. Further development of this must be delayed 
for the moment, however. 
Returning to the question of the one and the many, 
we see that Socrates finds nothing disturbing about the 
supposition that one is many and that many are one when 
it refers only to the visible realm. His difficulty 
arises in considering the intelligibles, or the eide of 
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things, for each of these is one and unique and can be 
encountered only in speech. 1 1 How can they retain 
their unity while being split up amongst an indefinite 
number of particulars? Socrates holds that the only 
way to answer this question is not by exploiting it 
polemically but rather by applying to it the dialecti-
cal method. It is necessary, for example, that we take 
note of the Pythagorean treatment of Limit and the 
Unlimited: we must see how each generic unity has 
within itself a definite number of "kinds" that mediate 
between itself and the infinity of particulars into 
which finally it vanishes. 1 1 Between the original One 
and the original Many, there are many "Ones," and the 
philosopher's task is to discover both what these in-
termediates are and how many they are." This can be 
done through the method of division. In other words, 
the philosopher must look for one eidos and then for 
two, if there are two, or for some other number if 
there are more. He must treat each of the eide the 
same, subdividing them" " . . . until we come to see 
not merely that the one that we started with is a one 
and an unlimited many, but also just how many it is." 
(16d) This being done, it is then possible to dismiss 
the Idea of infinity. 1 8 
Socrates provides us with three examples of the 
method he is describing. The examples of sound in 
speech and musical sound show the mediated passage from 
a one to an indefinite plurality, while the example of 
letters in the alphabet illustrates the reverse proce-
dure. 1 7 However, it is not to be thought that the 
method Socrates is proposing is an easy one, for he is 
careful to stress the objective character of classifi-
cation. The classes ought not be too many or too few; 
they must correspond to the forms actually existing." 
It is the difficulty of the procedure which will cause 
Protarchus to object and which will result in a subse-
quent shift in the dialogue. 
Before this transition occurs there is a curious 
little section in which Philebus enters the conversa-
tion. He asks why Socrates embarked on this discussion 
of the one and the many and shows signs of intellectual 
curiosity. It is interesting to note that Protarchus, 
the defender of pleasure, provides the answer, namely, 
that Socrates was trying to determine whether or not 
there are eide of pleasure and of thoughtfulness that 
are distributed among the various beings that come to 
be and perish, among beings who live lives in pleasure 
and in thought." The very fact that these two in-
terlocutors who defend the primacy of pleasure to the 
detriment of thoughtfulness are caught up in a discus-
sion that attempts intellectually to settle on the 
nature of the good life is ironic, and that irony is 
never so pointed as in this passage where the processes 
of intellect and reason are defended by Protarchus as 
the means of establishing what is the good life. 
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However, Protarchus' implicit defense of the 
thoughtful life soon dies away as he claims that the 
method Socrates proposes, a method which is the gift of 
the gods, is too difficult. He does not feel capable 
of classifying all of the various kinds of pleasure and 
asks Socrates either to make the classification himself 
or to find another method. This opens the question of 
whether there is some third which is the good, for if 
there is, then pleasure could not win the victory 
because it could not be identical with the good, and 
there would be no need to investigate further (20b-c). 
In the discussion which follows, three insights are 
developed. First, it is discovered that the Good and 
only the Good is self-sufficient (20d). Secondly, in 
trying to separate the life of pleasure from the 
thoughtful life to consider each independently, taking 
from each all qualities which belong to the other, it 
is found that neither life is self-sufficient, desira-
ble, or good in itself. Without thought, knowledge, 
memory and opinion, the pleasant life cannot be en-
joyed, and without pleasure, the thoughtful life is 
sterile (21d-e). Thirdly, from the two observations 
above, the conclusion is drawn that the good life, the 
kind of life that everyone would choose, is one that is 
composed of a proper mixture of pleasure and thought-
fulness. Neither pleasure nor thoughtfulness alone can 
be assigned to the good life (22a-b). 
There are several interesting observations that can 
be made about the discussion. First, it is quite im-
portant to stress just how much thoughtfulness depends 
upon pleasure and pleasure depends upon thoughtfulness 
in the good life. The pleasant life in itself is not 
really pleasant, and the thoughtful life in itself is 
not really reasonable. We see this is so because 
thoughtfulness itself not only gives pleasure but at 
the same time gives the power of appreciating or ex-
periencing pleasure. Moreover, it is unreasonable to 
want a life of pure thoughtfulness devoid of pleasure 
because the human condition by its very constitution 
requires that thoughtfulness be experienced as pleasur-
able. Second, we should notice that, while Socrates' 
refutation of the pleasant life as the good life is 
based upon the notion of choice worthiness, it is clear 
that it, along with the life of thoughtfulness, is 
rejected with respect to the criterion of adequacy and 
perfection as well. Third, it ought to be noted that 
the refutation of Philebus' contention constitutes only 
a small portion of the dialogue. The major part of the 
dialogue consists in trying to show that while pleasure 
is necessary for happiness it is less valuable than in-
tellectual activity. In order to demonstrate this, it 
will be necessary for Socrates to return to a discrimi-
nation of the various kinds of pleasure. He must dist-
inguish between true and false pleasures and between 
pure and mixed pleasures. Finally, it would be noted 
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that Socrates here shifts from his original contention 
that reason is the cause of that Goodness found in the 
mixed life to the position that reason is nearer and 
more akin than is pleasure to that which makes a life 
both good and desirable. The purpose for this change 
in position becomes clear later in the dialogue (65a-b) 
when we discover that neither of the components of the 
good life make it what it is. Rather, we shall find 
that the characters of Measure, Proportion, and 
Symmetry inherent in the composition of the good life 
are the source of its goodness. We shall find that 
even the pleasures present in the good life will have 
these characters, but will have them only because, and 
to the degree that, reason, through its control, im-
parts and maintains them. 1 0 Hackforth tells us that we 
shall see that, " . . . the cause of the goodness in the 
Mixed Life is twofold; . . . the Formal Cause is . . . 
the right quantitative relation between the various 
kinds of intellectual activity and pleasurable ex-
perience which are admitted; while the Efficient Cause 
is Reason; immediately, the controlling reason of the 
individual man, but ultimately the Cosmic Reason, on 
which the individual's reason is declared to be depen-
dent . . ." 2 1 
III 
The stage is set for a discussion which will ulti-
mately lead to a disclosure of Cosmic Reason as the 
causative and controlling factor in the universe, a 
discussion which will show human reason's superiority 
over pleasure. This new discussion will involve a div-
ision of the universe into what Klein calls four 
tribes. 1 2 These four tribes consist in the Unlimited 
and Limit, which are the two constituents revealed by 
God, next that which arises out of the mixture of them 
both, and finally the cause of the mixing of these two 
things with one another (23c-d). Socrates starts with 
a desciription of the Unlimited. First, he says that 
it is in a sense a many. The Unlimited is concerned 
with boundless pairs, with "the more" and "the less." 
If a term were absolutely set, it would mean the end of 
their existence, for such things as "hotter and colder" 
never stop where they are but continue always to go to 
a point further. Definite quantity implies a cessation 
of movement (24-b). In other words, the Unlimited is 
indeterminate and ceases to be the Unlimited when it is 
fixed by a determined number. But it is at the same 
time a duality which has the seed of a single nature. 
It is not the more or the less which is the Unlimited; 
it is the more as well as the less which is the 
Unlimited. 2' 
Turning now to the second tribe, we find that it 
consists of those things that do not admit of the terms 
found in the first tribe. Limit, rather, admits of the 
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opposite terms, " . . . terms like 'equal' and 'equal-
ity' in the first place and then 'double' and any term 
expressing a ratio of one number to another, or one 
unit of measurement to another . . . " (25a-b). But 
Socrates goes on to postulate a family of the Limit, a 
family paralleling the family of "hotter and colder," 
"drier and wetter," etc., belonging to the tribe of the 
Limit (25c-d). This family is the Limited and consists 
in that which brings proportion and ends variability 
between opposites through the introduction of number. 
In short, it consists of ratios. 
The distinction between Limit and Limited is that 
the Limited is that which has limit. 1* The full power 
of this distinction comes out in an examination of the 
third tribe, where, indeed, the Limited makes its full 
appearance. Socrates tells us that the source of all 
beautiful things is to be found in the third tribe, in 
the mixture of the Unlimited with the Limited (261-b). 
What seems actually to be taking place in the third 
tribe is that the Limitless, or the indeterminate dyad, 
and the Limit, or the One, are exerting their respec-
tive "powers" upon one another. Through this exertion 
of power, these two arche interact in the following 
manner. The indeterminate dyad duplicates or copies 
the One. In other words, it produces two entities or 
eide. It continues this process indefinitely. 
(Aristotle tells us that Plato considered the indeter-
minate dyad to be the doubling power which is the ulti-
mate source of definite manyness, the source of 
"numbers" both in the realm of the eide and in our 
realm as well.) 2' 
Earlier, when Socrates first mentions the two arche 
as the gift of Prometheus and tells us that in every 
case a definite number of eide must be found, he 
dismisses consideration of the application of the 
character of Unlimitedness until this number has been 
discovered (16d). But at the point in the dialogue we 
are now considering (25-26) he does not so dismiss 
Unlimitedness because he is considering the world in 
which we live, and the Limitless is necessarily an ele-
ment in the world. 2' I think this is important for we 
shall see that pleasure is to be identified with the 
Limitless. By saying that the Limitless cannot be ban-
ished from our world, we are saying that pleasure can-
not be banished from our individual lives. In this 
world, Limit, or the One, acts upon the indeterminate 
dyad, changing it into a determinate one. In other 
words, it acts upon the two constantly changing terms 
of the dyad transforming them into two stationary and 
determinate ones and continues this process thereby 
producing a multitude of "ratios." These "ratios," 
then, which constitute the Limited, are what Socrates 
calls the offspring of Limit. 2 7 From this, we can 
gather that, while the Limited is a member of the 
family of Limit, it belongs to the third tribe. The 
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closeness of these two suggests the primary position of 
Limit with respect to the mixture while at the same 
time not dismissing Limitlessness as superfluous. We 
should note that the Limited as part of the third tribe 
represents mixture of a special kind. It represents 
those mathematical partnerships that can give to 
parts of the world we live in a certain Tight-
ness, remove the excess and indefiniteness, and 
produce balance and right measure. Such mathe-
matical partnerships engender, for example, 
health, establish the entire genuine art of 
music, bring about the temperate seasons and all 
the bounties of the soul. 2' 
The fourth tribe consists of that which causes 
things to happen in the physical universe. This tribe 
makes things to be what they are and is in general 
responsible for all change and motion. This tribe is 
the cause, it is the nous working throughout the entire 
physical universe. As such, it is animate being. But 
the change which takes place in the universe has about 
it a certain uniformity and regularity which is ex-
pressible in laws or formulae. Therefore, this cause 
must be rational soul or mind, which is the reason we 
can call it nous. It is rational soul which performs 
the dual function of causing change and causing or-
derliness and regularity. 2 9 
Hackforth points out that if such an Intelligence 
exists as cause, there will be grounds for arguing that 
man's intelligence, as part of the mixed life of the 
individual, has a closer relation to the cause of the 
good life's goodness than does pleasure. He goes on to 
say that it is not our intelligence which makes the 
mixed life good, but rather nous acting as an external 
efficient cause imposing Limit on the Unlimited gives 
the good life its summetria. 3 0 
Jacob Klein, on the other hand, paints quite a 
different picture. He points out that Socrates was 
reluctant to admit the fourth tribe into consideration 
at all and questions if there is any reason for postu-
lating it. He argues that it is the common power of 
the Limitless and the Limit that is the cause of the 
mixture, as well as of that which is engendered in it, 
and that Socrates did not show that the cause which 
fabricates the other three tribes is distinct from 
them. He asks how it could be that two ultimate 
sources could be caused by an other, since to say this 
would be to say that the Limitless and the Limit are 
not what they are. In effect, Klein does not think 
that Socrates actually admitted this fourth tribe as 
distinct from the other three. 3 1 But I would like to 
offer several objections to Klein's position and then 
suggest somewhat of a middle course between Klein's and 
Hackforth's respective stands, a course that I believe 
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will shed some light on the nature of the good life for 
Socrates. 
To Klein's objection that Socrates admits the 
fourth tribe while fearing that he may be making a 
mistake, Marsillio Ficino's observation that Socrates 
promised only to enumerate those things existent in the 
universe and that there can only be three such things 
forms an apt reply. Ficino holds that Socrates intro-
duced the fourth tribe because it would be ridiculous 
to discuss the three tribes within the universe without 
referring to the cause which is above the universe. 1 2 
In other words, Socrates hesitated not because there 
was no independent cause but because he had originally 
agreed to consider solely the three tribes within the 
universe. 
A second objection comes from Damascius who says 
that there can only be a symbolical value given to the 
distinction between the two principles of Limit and 
Limitlessness because there is no such distinction, no 
separateness of any sort, on the purely intelligible 
plane. He summarizes as follows: "In a way, there-
fore, there is not even duality younder, but there is 
an unknowable. One after the Unknowable, then another 
unknowable principle of plurality; then, in accordance 
with the current view among philosophers, the intellig-
ible world." 1 1 If his view is correct, then the notion 
of cause is certainly more primary than the notions of 
Limitlessness and Limit. Still a third objection might 
simply be Socrates' claim that one must regard it as 
necessary that a cause be postulated for all things 
that come to be, as the cause is more primary than the 
caused (26e-27a). 
However, to do justice to Klein we must note that 
he does not wish to dismiss the cause but rather to 
dismiss a cause which exists outside of Limit and 
Limitlessness. On the contrary, Hackforth downplays 
individual nous in favor of the cosmic nous. Klein, as 
we shall see, will insist that the individual's nous is 
responsible for the happy life. I should like to sug-
gest that both are to a certain degree correct, and to 
a certain degree mistaken. It is the individual nous 
which is, as Klein says, responsible for the kind of 
mixture which is made to produce the life which com-
bines thoughtfulness and pleasure. 1* The invividual 
nous is able to act as it does, however, only because 
there is an overarching structure of reality which it 
imitates. Whether or not the cosmic nous is to be 
found outside of the power of Limitlessness and Limit 
is irrelevant—recognition of the role of the fourth 
tribe is what is central. The beauty, truth, and due 
measure found in the good life must reflect the beauty, 
truth, and due measure found in the universe, or else 
the good life would not be the good life since it would 
not be reflective of that which is ultimately good. 
The individual nous must act to cause the proper mix-
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ture, but if there is an individual nous, which Klein 
says there is, acting as it acts, then there must be a 
cosmic nous which it imitates. But we are anticipating 
many of the clarifications yet to be made. Let us 
briefly summarize what has been said in this section of 
the dialogue and then return to Socrates' battle for 
"second prize." 
We found that the reality of the Unlimited is 
rooted in the fact that it functions as the material 
used in the forming activity of the Limit, while the 
reality of the Limit is rooted in the fact that it 
gives form to the formless. The reality of the Mixed 
is centered in the fact that the Unlimited and the 
Limited, while capable of being separated through ab-
straction, nonetheless have been united and given in 
the Mixed. 1* Finally, the postulation of the reality 
of the cause as a fourth tribe can be based ". . . in 
the fact that the process of development, through which 
this alone could and can happen, is not merely known as 
a logical cause of an event, but is initiated as an im-
pact, the actuality of which is put outside the whole 
action of causally connected events at which we can ar-
rive by a mere logical procedure and by tracing back 
the whole process."*' 
IV 
Socrates: "Come along now, what is our next point, 
and what was our purpose in getting to where we have 
got? Wasn't it that we were trying to find out whether 
the second prize would go to pleasure or to intelli-
gence?" (27c). Immediately, Socrates brings us back to 
the more concrete concerns of the dialogue. He starts 
once again to consider the nature of pleasure and 
aligns it with the Limitless, with that which admits of 
"the more" and "the less" (27e). It is interesting to 
note that it is Philebus who agrees with this, saying 
that pleasure must admit of "the more" and be unlimited 
both in quantity and degree if it is to be the best 
(27e). It is ironic, I think, that this should be the 
justification for classing pleasure along with the 
Limitless, as the Limitless is indeterminate and in 
need of order; but it is Philebus, the symbol of pleas-
ure, who thoughtlessly assigns pleasure its realm. 
However, the designation may be correct while the rea-
sons may be wrong. That this is the case receives some 
verification through Socrates' observation that pain 
likewise must find its home in the same realm (28a). 
Pleasure and pain, then, are a limitless pair. 
Thus, there can be, properly speaking, no eide of 
pleasure, for eide come about only as the result of the 
implementation of ratio. This provides a second, hid-
den reason why Socrates did not attempt earlier to di-
vide pleasure into its eide but rather turned immedi-
ately towards the search for some third. 1 1 
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Turning now to consider to which tribe nous 
belongs, we shall see that Socrates offers a cosmologi-
cal argument for placing it in the fourth tribe. Klein 
dismisses this account as a playful one, 1* but perhaps 
this section has a good deal more to say. Socrates and 
Protarchus begin by agreeing that the cosmos is ordered 
and that they can discern certain constituents of the 
corporeal nature of all animals, these being fire, 
water, earth, and air (28d-29a). Yet, in individuals 
these constituents, according to Socrates, are found in 
only a very limited degree and are, moreover, lacking 
in quality and power when compared to their real 
nature. Using fire as an example, Socrates shows us 
that the constituents found in us are dependent upon 
these same constituents found in their purer form in 
the universe (29b-c). 
Now, the constituents, when taken as a collective 
unity, are given the name body. Our body, therefore, 
is dependent upon the universe's body for its coming to 
be. Moreover, Socrates tells us that our body has a 
soul and that the only way it could have derived a soul 
is from the soul of the universe (29d-30a). This seems 
to support the position that the individual and the 
life of the individual ought to reflect the structure 
of reality. Socrates goes on to say that there is an 
ordering principle to the universe which has a right to 
the names of wisdom and reason (30c). Wisdom and 
reason, then, belong to the fourth tribe (30d-e). 
Socrates: "Then let us have these points in mind about 
the pair of them, namely that reason was found akin to 
cause and belonging, we may say, to that kind, whereas 
pleasure is itself unlimited and belongs to the kind 
that does not and never will contain within itself and 
derived from itself either beginning, or middle, or 
end." (31a). We might go so far here as to award the 
second prize to reason, for, as we saw earlier, cause 
is more primary than that which comes to be, whereas 
pleasure, as aligned with the indeterminate, is contin-
ually coming to be. 
Yet, Socrates wants to embark on an investigation 
of reason and pleasure to determine where each is found 
and what happens to make them come about when they do 
occur. Socrates begins again with pleasure (31b). He 
first notes that there are some pleasures which involve 
the restoration of equilibrium to the physical organ-
ism, that restoration resulting in a cessation of pain. 
The second type of pleasures and pains mentioned are 
those involving an anticipation of the first sort. 
Feelings of pleasure accompany expectations of pleasant 
experience while feelings of anxiety accompany expecta-
tions of future pains. Now the anticipation of future 
pleasure can exist alongside the present experience of 
actual pain. This is one type of what Socrates shall 
call mixed pleasures. 1' Socrates' examination of these 
mixed anticipatory pleasures brings up the point that 
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desire does not belong to the body since every 
creature's energy is directed against the body's pre-
sent state and towards a more adequate state (35c). 
The desire for something opposed to experience, 
moreover, proves the existence of memory (35c). "Our 
discussion then, inasmuch as it has proved that memory 
is what leads us on to the object of our desire, has 
made it plain that it is to the soul that all impulse 
and desire, and indeed the determining principle of the 
whole creature belong" (35d). 
Thus, once again pleasure, because it is dependent, 
plays a subsidiary role. But Socrates also mentions a 
third state in which one neither feels pleasure nor 
pain. The one who can live a life of thoughtfulness 
can live in this state, he says, and he further com-
ments that it is the most god-like (32e-33b). This 
certainly seems at odds with what was said earlier 
concerning a life devoid of pleasure as not being 
desirable any more than a life devoid of reason, 
memory, etc. The answer to this is, I think, twofold 
and has already been mentioned. First, we are not gods 
and are therefore susceptible to the structure of this 
world. Secondly, the two types of pleasure mentioned 
above are mixed pleasures. But Socrates will, as we 
shall see, propose that there exist certain pure pleas-
ures which are admissible to the good life. 
Through his observation that one can experience 
pain in the body and at the same time experience pleas-
ure in the soul through an anticipation of relief from 
that pain, Socrates raises the question of whether 
pleasures and pains can be considered to be true or 
false (36a-c). Protarchus' position is basically that, 
no matter what one's condition, one cannot suppose that 
he is pleased or pained unless he really is pleased or 
pained, and, similarly, whether a person is holding an 
opinion rightly or wrongly, he is still holding an 
opinion (37a-b). Socrates counters by saying that we 
nonetheless consider opinions to be distinguished with 
regard to their truth and falsity and asks how 
Protarchus can hold that the same ought not be held 
with respect to pleasures. 
In order to show that pleasure indeed is no more 
exempt from the claims of truth and falsity than opin-
ion, Socrates introduces three types of false pleasure. 
The first type is that which accompanies false 
belief.* 8 With respect to opinion, we find that false-
hood and truth supervene causing the opinion to be of a 
certain sort, either true or false; and so do pleasure 
and pain, just as opinions, have similar qualities. 
Accordingly, it must be agreed that pleasure can be 
either good or bad and can also be incorrect or correct 
with respect to the object that is arousing the 
feeling. In other words, it must be admitted that it 
is possible to experience pleasure when the opinion on 
which that pleasure is based is false (37d-e). 
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Protarchus, however, continues to stubbornly hold that, 
while the opinion is false, the pleasure cannot be so 
classed (38a). Socrates finally attempts to resolve 
the issue by using the image of a scribe who writes 
certain things which are true and certain things which 
are false in the soul and thereby produces true and 
false opinions respectively. Likewise, pictures of 
false pleasures are painted on the minds of the evil 
(39a, 40b-c). 
The point being made in considering this first 
false pleasure is that it is not true to fact to con-
sider the pleasure-feeling in abstraction from its ob-
jective reference just as it is not true to fact to 
consider the act of opining or judging in abstraction 
from its object." 1 When one says that he takes pleas-
ure in a certain belief, he does not mean that he takes 
pleasure in his believing but rather that he takes 
pleasure in the proposition believed.* 1 
The second kind of false pleasure is that which 
results from the overestimation or underestimation of a 
pleasure due to the fact that one is comparing it to a 
pain.* 1 Both pleasure and pain can be experienced at 
the same time in the mind, but one of them may have its 
source in the body while the other has its source only 
in the mind. Because the feeling "supplied" by the 
body is "close to hand" while that in the mind is at a 
"distance," the former is liable to exaggeration while 
the latter is subject to being underrated. The real 
magnitude of either feeling could be found only if the 
illusory part were subtracted, which is impossible. 
This second type of falsity is due to the unlimited 
character of pleasure and pain, for, if precise mathe-
matical determination could be introduced, mistakes 
with respect to magnitude would not be made.** 
The third type of false pleasure which Socrates 
mentions is actually a misclassification of the neutral 
state as either the pleasant or the painful state. 
There are times when neither pleasure nor pain are 
felt, but one may claim mistakenly that he is ex-
periencing either pleasure or pain simply because there 
is ambiguity in his feeling nothing.* 5 Noting this 
third type of false pleasure brings to Socrates' mind 
those who do not believe that pleasure exists at all 
but rather hold that what is called pleasure is nothing 
more than release from pain (44b-c). They open the way 
to a discussion of the various forms of mixed pleasure, 
that is, of pleasure mixed with pain. This discussion 
is important for it provides the background to an in-
troduction to true pleasures. 
It is in the profligate rather than the temperate 
life that the most extreme pleasures are to be found. 
Yet, when one is mastered by these extreme pleasures, 
he becomes insane. Thus, the greatest pains accompany 
the most extreme pleasures, and the most extreme pleas-
ures and pains occur when the body and soul are bad 
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rather than good. Socrates goes on to say that they 
ought to choose examples of such pleasures and consider 
what characteristic it is that makes them called 
greatest in magnitude. The pleasures he proposes to 
investigate are those which he says were refered to by 
the people who claimed that pleasures are only releases 
from pain. Protarchus calls these pleasures mixed. 
Socrates agrees and proceeds to give the various possi-
bilities of mixture (45d-46e). Socrates: 
Well, some of the mixtures concern the body and 
are found in the body alone, while others are 
found in the soul and belong to the soul alone, 
and thirdly we shall discover cases of pains be-
ing mixed with pleasures that involve both soul 
and body, where the total experience is sometimes 
called pleasure, sometimes pain (46b-c). 
The dialogue next moves naturally to a considera-
tion of true pleasures and shows that these are un-
mixed, for, while they are not the greatest, they are 
the purest of pleasures. In 51b Protarchus identifies 
unmixed pleasures with true pleasures indirectly simply 
by asking Socrates which pleasures ought to be consid-
ered by them as true. Socrates lists five different 
kinds of true pleasure, four of which are experienced 
through sensation while one involves that which cannot 
be sensed. The first four types of pleasure he lists 
have their source in beautiful figure, beautiful 
colour, clear sound, and many odours while the fifth 
kind of pleasure has its source in the known as knowa-
ble, in that which is accessible to human beings 
without accompaniment of a hunger for learning.*' 
What one immediately notices about all five of 
these pleasures is that they are unmixed with pain. 
Such things as straight lines, simple curves, colour, 
things which are not mere imitations of the sensory 
world, have as an intrinsic quality beauty, beauty 
which is not dependent upon contrast with something 
less beautiful or ugly in order to be recognized or 
called beautiful. The beauty they have is special, for 
it is the beauty of a differentiated unity, and of a 
differentiated unity with only the very minimum of 
differentiation.* 7 This view of their beauty is in 
perfect accord with the Greek . . 'principle that 
beauty consists in the imaginative or sensuous expres-
sion of unity in variety.'"*• Thus, we recognize 
beauty through the thoughtful consideration of these 
things, but the pleasure we feel is the result of our 
encasement in the human body. 
Socrates has by this point noted the difference 
between true and false pleasures, between mixed and un-
mixed pleasure. Hackforth blithely tells us that 
Socrates uses the two pairs of terms interchangeably 
but must now nevertheless show that pure pleasures are 
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always true ones and vice versa.*' While it is true 
that Socrates proceeds to make the latter observation 
with regard to pure and true pleasures, it is not so 
clear that he does not see a difference between the 
two. Andrew McLaughlin argues for such a definite 
distinction by noting the importance context plays when 
determining whether a pleasure is true or false. He 
harks back to the fact that pleasures like opinions 
have supervening qualities which make them true or 
false. Their truth or falsity cannot be judged in 
isolation from the circumstances surrounding their 
occurence. Thus, if they are excluded from the good 
life it is not because they are mixed with pain but 
simply because they are false. 
Nevertheless, while this distinction is cogent, it 
still seems that indeed mixed pleasures are false and 
that false pleasures are mixed. Mixed pleasures are 
always false pleasures for we have already seen that it 
is impossible to properly judge the degree of a pleas-
ure or pain due to the fact that pleasure and pain 
belong to the Limitless and thus do not of themselves 
make a unit. False pleasures are always mixed because 
pleasure can never be separated from context, and, if 
the context is other than one thinks it, one is neces-
sarily pained by a discontinuity of relation with real-
ity even if one is not aware of that discontinuity. 
Similarly, we have already seen that true pleasures 
are unmixed. But we have not yet seen that all unmixed 
pleasures are true. This is easily discerned once we 
realize that what characterizes all of the pure pleas-
ures noted above is that they have due measure: they 
are the pleasures of the temperate and have thoughtful-
ness involved in their accomplishment. Because of 
this, they are likewise true pleasures because they can 
be known for what they are and measured." This leads 
us into a transition in the dialogue that shows the 
parallel between true and false pleasures and mixed and 
unmixed pleasures. 
The section which we are now entering may be di-
vided into three parts. The first part makes the point 
that pure pleasures are, as we have said, characterized 
by due measure. Socrates makes the point that the more 
intense the pleasure, the more it is mixed with its op-
posite, pain (52c-d). Thus, bulk or intensity cannot 
serve as the criterion of truth in pleasure, but rather 
measure or moderation 1B the essential attribute of 
true pleasure. Yet, since pleasure belongs to the Lim-
itless, something must be added to it in order to give 
it measure and make it true.* 1 In the second part, we 
discover that the pure pleasures, because they are 
pure, are also true." Socrates uses the example of 
whiteness to show this, saying that the purest white-
ness is also the truest (52e-53a). At the conclusion 
of his examination of whiteness, he says that we, 
" are now in a position to realize that any and every 
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sort of pleasure that is pure of pain will be pleasan-
ter, truer, and fairer than one that is not, whatever 
be their comparative bulk or quantity" (53b-c). The 
third part consists in an argument stemming from the 
premise that pleasure consists in a continual process 
of generation, having no stable being. Socrates begins 
by noting that some things exist with a view to some-
thing else while others are those for which the first 
exist. Now, it is becoming which is for the sake of 
being, just as it is the art of shipbuilding which is 
for the sake of the ship. But since pleasure is a 
becoming, it must come to be for the sake of something 
else. Now in the relationship of means to end, it is 
the end which falls under the heading of good while the 
means falls under some other heading. ' Thus, pleasure 
must fall under a heading other than the good and can-
not be identified as the good (53b-54d). But the argu-
ment does not end here. Socrates goes on to note that 
the opposite of becoming is passing away and that it is 
therefore the alternation of passing away and becoming 
which is chosen by one who choses a life of pleasure in 
preference to a life of the purest possible activity of 
thought (55a). 
Hackforth finds this third section coming at this 
point in the discussion to be somewhat perplexing, for 
he feels that it denies the association of good with 
pleasure in any way and goes beyond saying that pleas-
ure is not the sole or chief good. This seems, says 
Hackforth, to go against earlier statements in the di-
alogue at 13b and 28a which indicate that some pleas-
ures ought to be admitted to the good life. Moreover, 
it goes against the later affirmation that certain 
pleasures are to be admitted to the good life. How to 
explain this? 
Hackforth offers as one solution the fact that the 
conclusion is only provisional since the initial pre-
mise is conditional. He explains that Socrates devel-
ops such an argument for two reasons. First, he points 
out that the doctrine that pleasure is a becoming was 
one current at the time and could not be ignored in any 
discussion concerning pleasure. Secondly, he says that 
it is an argument whose conclusion is less anti-
hedonistic when it is considered only provisionally.' 1 
A second possible solution suggests itself when 
Klein argues that the purpose of the argument is to ask 
whether being is for the sake of becoming or becoming 
for the sake of being.** Since pleasure is limitless 
and thoughtfulness has limit, pleasure is becoming 
while thoughtfulness simply is, and pleasure is thus 
for the sake of thoughtfulness. If one would interpret 
the passage this way, I think it is possible to argue 
that pleasure is not dismissed but rather assigned its 
proper position. 
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V 
After an appeal to common sense against the view 
that one is better or worse depending on the degree of 
intensity to which he experiences pleasure or pain, 4 5 
Socrates turns to an examination of nous and knowledge 
in order that he might discover the truest element in 
them, compare it to the truest element in pleasure, and 
come to the best decision with regard to which ought to 
receive the second prize (55a). He begins a process of 
division, dividing knowledge into that which produces 
things and that which serves education and nurture. He 
then divides productive knowledge into precise and im-
precise knowledge. To precise productive arts he as-
signs measure and counting and says that they are supe-
rior to the imprecise productive arts. He then dis-
tinguishes between precise productive arts in which the 
measuring and counting deal with visible, tangible 
units and those which deal with entities that cannot be 
sensed. This latter class includes geometry and is the 
realm of the philosopher. Moreover, it is not for the 
sake of production and trade but rather for that of 
education and nurture." Protarchus shows the impor-
tance of this last class by saying " . . . let our 
statement be that the arts which we have had before us 
are superior to all others, and that those among them 
which involve the effort of the true philosopher are, 
in their use of measure and number, immensely superior 
in point of exactness and truth . . . " (57c-d). 
However, beyond pure mathematical knowledge there 
lies the power of dialectic which has its primacy in 
the fact that it deals with True Being, with that Being 
which always and immutably is. 9 7 Protarchus raises the 
objection that he has heard elsewhere that rhetoric 
rather than dialectic is the greatest art since it has 
the power to subjugate all things by their own submis-
sion rather than by violence. Socrates replies that 
they are searching for the art or form of knowledge 
which devotes most attention to precision, exactness, 
and the fullest truth rather than for that which is 
greatest otherwise (58b-c). What one must ask is 
whether there is a power in the soul which is in love 
with Truth and acts for the sake of Truth. Acknowl-
edging that there is such a power, one must concede 
that it possesses thoughtfulness and nous in their 
greatest purity. But to be in love with Truth is not 
the same as possessing it. Rather, such love involves 
the pursuit of Truth, and such pursuit involves submis-
sion to the power of discourse, ". . . a power that is 
able to discover in the spoken or silent words that 
which makes speaking and thinking ultimately possible, 
namely the unchangeable and, thereby, true beings."" 
The majority of other arts deal with opinion, and 
those who consider themselves students of reality spend 
their time studying the corporeal universe, which comes 
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to be and passes away. They therefore are not 
concerned with that which always is but rather with 
that which is becoming. Truth, however, does not at-
tach itself to that which is subject to change. Such 
things can never be permanently grasped. Thus, nous 
and thoughtfulness, or phronesis, are not attached to 
changing opinion either, since they are the givers of 
perfect truth (59a-b). Socrates concludes, "[tjhat we 
find fixity, purity, truth, and what we have called 
perfect clarity, either in those things that are al-
ways, unchanged, unaltered, and free of all admixture, 
or in what is most akin to them; everything else must 
be called inferior and of secondary importance . . ." 
(59c). 
The purpose of what has been surveyed thus far has 
been to set the stage for determining whether pleasure 
or thoughtfulness is most akin to the good life. We 
have found that it is in the well-mixed life that good-
ness is to be found. It is to be found in the well-
mixed life not as an ingredient but as the form of the 
mixture itself.' 1 In other words, it actually consti-
tutes the mixture as well-mixed. We have also isolated 
the purest pleasures and the purest form of thoughtful-
ness and nous, that which deals with True Being. By 
seeing how these two are properly mixed, we discover 
both the goodness in the good life and who is to 
receive the second prize. 
To this end, we need to ask ourselves "what pre-
cisely is to be included in our mixture?" Socrates 
begins by noting how absurd it would be if only the 
purest forms of thoughtfulness were admitted—one could 
not cope with everyday situations and could not then be 
happy. All forms of nous and phronesis must be admit-
ted (62c-d). This is important for it points out that 
we are discussing the good life for the human. In the 
Phaedo, it will be remembered, Socrates excluded pleas-
ure from the good life, but the pleasure he excluded 
was of an inferior sort. Here, by noting that all 
forms of thoughtfulness must be admitted to the good 
life, even the impure ones, he is able to move beyond 
asking if certain pleasures should be admitted to 
asking what pleasures should be admitted. He is recog-
nizing, in other words, that the good human life 
because it is the human life necessarily involves 
pleasure in its mixture just as it necessarily involves 
knowledge of becoming in its mixture. Thus, true 
pleasures and necessary ones as well must be admitted 
to the mixture (62e). But should all pleasure be 
admitted? Socrates answers that all forms of nous and 
thoughtfulness are agreeable to pleasure (63b-c), but 
is it the case that all of the various pleasures are 
agreeable to nous and thoughtfulness? This, in fact, 
is not the case, for in reply to Socrates' query as to 
whether all pleasures should be admitted to the good 
life is the contention that it would be senseless to 
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mix with nous those pleasures which madden men's souls 
and are in other ways contrary to virtue." Intense 
pleasures serve only as obstacles to nous, while true 
and necessary pleasures are in accord with it. 
Protarchus agrees (63d-64a). 
We have now come to view the mixture of the good 
life and are in a position to ask to whom the second 
prize belongs. But Klein asks us first to turn to a 
consideration of nous and phronesis. In 64a Socrates 
drops phronesis and says only that it would be sense-
less to mix pleasure with nous. Klein asks what nous 
this is. Is this the divine nous mentioned earlier? 
No, it is Socrates' own nous, for Socrates is answering 
guided by his own nous, says Klein. It is Socrates' 
nous which is responsible for the kind of mixture that 
results in a life combining thoughtfulness and pleas-
ure. This nous is the cause neither of the first two 
tribes nor of their commixture. Nous for Socrates, ac-
cording to Klein, is above all a human possession. The 
original reference to it as the cause of all and the 
subsequent limitation of it to the human realm is 
merely an attack on certain doctrines raised by Aristo-
tle at the time.' 1 
It seems to me that Klein's assertion that Socra-
tes' nous is responsible for the mixture of phronesis 
and nous with pleasure resulting in the good life 
serves to support rather than damage our initial con-
tention that there is some sense in which nous plays 
the role of a distinctive cosmic cause. We have con-
tended that the good life is a reflection of Reality 
just as we contain within ourselves the elements of 
earth, air, fire, and water found in the universe. 
Just as our nous is responsible for the mixture that 
composes the good life, so the cosmic nous is responsi-
ble for that mixture which is known as the Real. 
Socrates' statement in 64b concerning the need for 
Reality in order that the good life might exist seems 
to suggest this. 
After Socrates makes his comment concerning 
Reality, he enters the final stage of the dialogue 
through his assertion that beauty, truth, and due meas-
ure give a mixture its goodness.* 1 Unless a mixture 
exhibits measure and proportion, it is no real mixture 
at all, but only 1 1. . . a miserable mass of unmixed 
messiness." Now, since the qualities of measure and 
proportion are constitutive of beauty and excellence, 
we can say as well that the goodness of the mixture 
takes refuge in beauty (64e). Socrates concludes: 
Then if we cannot hunt down the good under a sin-
gle form, let us secure it by the conjunction of 
three, beauty, proportion, and truth, and then, 
regarding these three as one, let us assert that 
that may most properly be held to determine the 
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qualities of the mixture, and because that is 
good the mixture itself has become so. (65a). 
At this point, we are in a position to ask whether 
nous or pleasure is more akin to that which constitutes 
the goodness of the mixture. In deciding this, vre find 
which wins the second prize. We must therefore con-
sider whether nous or pleasure is closer to beauty, 
proportion, and truth. With regard to truth, Protar-
chus readily agrees that pleasure is the greatest of 
imposters. He uses the example of love and says that 
for the pleasures of love even the gods forgive 
perjury. Reason, however, because it is identical with 
truth, is likewise the truest thing in the world. 
Again, with regard to proportion, Protarchus readily 
admits that pleasure is that which is most unmeasured 
in character (as we saw earlier, it is that which ad-
mits of the more and the less), while nous and phrone-
sis are by nature the most measured. Lastly, 
Protarchus tells us that no one has ever had a vision 
of nous or phronesis as ugly, nor can there ever be 
such a vision. But, with respect to pleasure, there is 
always an element of the ridiculous or of the ugly ap-
prehensible, especially as regards the greatest pleas-
ures (65c066a). 
At last, Socrates is able to set down a list of 
possessions, with a given hierarchy to be assigned to 
the good life. Measure is the first of all posses-
sions. The second lies in the region of what is 
proportional and beautiful. Reason and intelligence 
occupy the third realm, while the fourth consists of 
that which belongs to the soul itself, namely, the 
sciences, the arts, and right opinion. These are more 
akin to the good than pleasure. Finally comes the true 
pleasures, some of which attach to knowledge and others 
to sensation (66a-c). 
But the dialogue has accomplished much more than 
arrive at this list; it has shown the inner workings of 
these five possessions and the profound relationship 
which exists between the good life and Reality. From 
what has been said, I think it is safe to conclude that 
what is most important in the dialogue foundationally 
is that there is first a unity and then a duality (not 
a plurality) which is yet a unity because of a certain 
interdependence. This duality is Limit and the 
Limitless. It is through the imposition of Limit on 
the Limitless brought about through nous, whether nous 
be a principle inherent in these arche or the unity 
from which they in some way procede, that mixture 
arises. This mixture consists of the eide and is 
characterized by number, measure, proportion. Indeed, 
the eide are right number, right measure, right propor-
tion, and it is in imitation of right number, measure, 
and proportion ranging throughout the universe that the 
good life derives its goodness. In other words, the 
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good life is good because it reflects numbers, measure 
and proportion, which together constitute the Being of 
Reality. 
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